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CLIMATE JUSTICE
Daniel A. Farber*

By Eric A. Posner and David Weisbach.
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2010. Pp. viii, 220. $27.95.
CLIMATE CHANGE JUSTICE.

INTRODUCTION

Eric Posner and David Weisbach' take the threat of climate change
ously. Their book Climate Change Justice offers policy prescriptions
deserve serious attention.2 While the authors adopt the framework of
ventional welfare economics, they show a willingness to engage
noneconomic perspectives, which softens their conclusions. Although

serithat
conwith
they

are right to see a risk that overly aggressive ethical claims could derail inter-

national agreement on restricting greenhouse gases, their analysis makes
climate justice too marginal to climate policy.3 The developed world does
have a special responsibility for the current climate problem, and we should

be willing both to agree to more stringent restrictions on emissions to protect future generations and the global poor and to agree to assist poor

nations with their own adaptation and mitigation measures.
Climate Change Justice has not had a friendly reception from the readers who care most about the topic. One review bears the pungent title How
Not to Think About Climate Change Justice.4 Another reviewer complains

that "it is hard to see the justice in Posner and Weisbach's Climate Change

*
Sho Sato Professor of Law and Chair, Energy and Resources Group at the University of California, Berkeley. I would like to thank Michael Hanemann, John Nagle, Michael
Vandenbergh, and David Weisbach for their comments on an earlier draft, and Anna Kantenbacher for her research assistance and feedback.
1. Posner and Weisbach are both Professors of Law, University of Chicago Law
School. Cass Sunstein coauthored some of the articles on which Climate Change Justice is
based, but could not be included as an author of the book because he now holds a politically
sensitive government position. Pp. vii-viii.
2. One policy prescription, for example, is for the use of carbon taxes rather than cap
and trade or other regulatory tools. P. 42. A counterargument can be found in Jonathan B.
Wiener, Property and Prices to Protect the Planet, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 515 (2009).
This Review does not address the choice of regulatory instruments.
3. For responses to earlier parts of this project, see Jonathan C. Carlson, Reflections on
a Problem of Climate Justice: Climate Change and the Rights of States in a Minimalist International Legal Order, 18 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45 (2009); Daniel A. Farber,
The Casefor Climate Compensation:Justicefor Climate Change Victims in a Complex World,
2008 UTAH L. REV. 377; and Amy Sinden, Allocating the Costs of the Climate Crisis: Efficiency Versus Justice, 85 WASH. L. Rav. 293 (2010).
4. Leonard J. Long, How Not To Think About Climate Change Justice, 29 QUINNIPIAC
L. REV. 463 (2011) (reviewing Climate Change Justice).
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perfunctory and sweeping
Justice."5 Yet another is disappointed by "such
6
dismissals of existing climate justice work."
This hostile reaction is understandable for reasons of style as well as
substance. The book is briskly paced; it often brushes aside opposing viewpoints rather brusquely. It is written from a philosophical perspective
(welfarism) that many reject. It also takes for granted the basic validity of a
controversial economic approach to social policy that is based on costbenefit analysis-an approach that holds, for example, that we ought to put
a dollar value on human life. In short, the hostile reaction is no wonder.
Nevertheless, it would be wrong to dismiss Climate Change Justice as
just another Chicago School brief for cost-benefit analysis. The book is not
simply a cookie-cutter example of conventional economic analysis. It makes
some important pragmatic and ethical points that may surprise readers with
a stereotyped view of Chicago-style law and economics. As the authors explain, their "argument is unusual" because they "favor a climate change
agreement, especially because it would help poor people in poor nations"
(and they also more generally "favor redistribution from the rich to the
poor"), but they simultaneously "reject the claim that certain intuitive ideas
about justice should play a major role in the design of a climate agreement"
(p. 5). Climate justice advocates who view issues of equity as centrally important to climate policy are understandably negative in their view of the
book.
Posner and Weisbach's rejection of these ethical arguments would seem
to justify the hostile response of advocates of climate justice. But Posner
and Weisbach are far from advocating that we should ignore the issue of
climate change or the interests of the global poor and future generations.
Posner and Weisbach have no hesitation in stating that "[c]limate change
ranks among the most serious problems facing the world today" (p. 1), that
it is "entirely beyond debate" that humans are causing significant climate
change (p. 16), and that failure to reach an international agreement would
"create exceedingly serious risks to human welfare, above all in poor nations."7 Given the state of American political discourse, support for these
points cannot simply be taken for granted.
Moreover, parts of Posner and Weisbach's position should be congenial
to their critics. Posner and Weisbach agree with climate justice advocates
that the "moral worth of individuals transcends spatial and temporal boundaries" (p. 169), and that "choosing projects solely through cost-benefit
analysis with discounting can result in serious injustice to the future"
5. Arvind Subramanian, Book Review, 10 WORLD TRADE REV. 277, 280 (2011) (reviewing Climate ChangeJustice).
6. Steve Vanderheiden, Book Review, 9 PERSP. ON POL. 133, 135 (2011) (reviewing
Climate Change Justice).
7. P. 192. It is clear that climate change requires a coordinated global response.
Whether that coordination should be embodied in a formal treaty, a less formal multilateral
agreement, or an even less formal network of cooperative arrangements is beyond the scope of
this Review. References to a "climate treaty" in this Review should be read to include any
method of forming an international response to climate change.
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(p. 159). They also go on record as "favoring a great deal of redistribution
from rich people in rich nations to poor people in poor nations-far more
redistribution, in fact, than is being seriously proposed today" (p. 190). Finally, Posner and Weisbach believe that it is unethical for nations to refuse
to join a climate treaty because those nations would prefer to free ride,
allowing other countries to make the necessary sacrifices to eliminate a
threat to global well-being (p. 182).
Despite these areas of harmony between Climate Change Justice and the
views of climate justice advocates, there is also a large gap between the two.
Posner and Weisbach criticize claims that developed countries should have
greater responsibility because of their wealth ("distributive justice") or because their past emissions have disproportionately contributed to climate
change ("compensatory justice") (pp. 72, 100). They are also skeptical of the
claim that climate regulations should be tightened because of our ethical duties to later generations (p. 145).
The next three sections of this Review critique Posner and Weisbach's
analysis of key ethical issues. Part I assesses their analysis of wealth distribution issues. They favor strenuous efforts to improve the lot of poor
countries, but are skeptical of pursuing this objective as part of a climate
agreement. Part II then considers their analysis of compensatory justice
(which they often call "corrective justice"). The two issues are closely related to the extent that rich nations have disproportionately contributed to
climate change and the poorest nations are likely to be the greatest victims
of climate change. Posner and Weisbach reject claims for compensation,
partly because they are concerned about whether it is possible to identify
victims and culpable actors with sufficient precision, but primarily because
they reject the idea of collective national responsibility for wrongdoing. Part
III considers another set of victims, the people of later generations. Posner
and Weisbach admit that climate change could impose unjust harms on later
generations, but they believe that the proper response is to provide compensation through increased savings and investment.
Whether the issue is distributive justice, compensatory justice, or the
rights of future generations, Posner and Weisbach vigorously question the
relevance of ethical claims as opposed to cost-benefit analysis in climate
policy. In each situation, however, they also qualify their criticisms in important ways. This Review suggests that these qualifications may have more
validity than the arguments themselves and that ethical claims are more relevant to climate policy than the authors suggest.
Finally, Part IV focuses on two dimensions of climate policy slighted by
Posner and Weisbach: the high degree of uncertainty surrounding the impacts of climate change, which makes economic analysis problematic, and
the closely connected possibility of local or global catastrophic outcomes.
These factors weaken the usefulness of cost-benefit analysis in climate policy and correspondingly call for more weight to be placed on ethical factors.
This Review will focus on the ethical arguments advanced by Posner
and Weisbach, but they also make an important pragmatic argument. They
worry that aggressive pursuit of ethical issues could derail any possibility of
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a climate agreement.8 Given the severity of the climate change problem,
they are correct that "[i]t would be a cruel irony if the consequence of justice-related arguments were to doom the prospects for an international
agreement-and thus to create exceedingly serious risks to human welfare,
above all in poor nations" (p. 192). But this is not an argument against the
validity of the ethical claims themselves, and it is particularly weak as a response to more nuanced, less extreme claims that would be less disruptive to
negotiations. Moreover, refusing to take developing countries' ethical arguments seriously has the potential to derail negotiations.
I. CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE GLOBAL POOR

Chapter Four of Climate Change Justice asks "whether rich nations have
a special obligation to deal with climate change, not because they are principally responsible for the problem, but simply because they are rich" (p.
73). The authors hedge their answer to this question, saying "[t]o a great
extent, these issues are and should be separate" (p. 73). "Other things being
equal," they reason, "the more sensible kind of redistribution would be a
cash transfer, so that poor nations can use the money as they see fit" (p. 78).
It is important to be clear about the baseline for determining whether a
redistribution has taken place. For Posner and Weisbach, the baseline is an
optimal climate treaty, where "optimal" means the most efficient in terms of
economic analysis. Because costs and benefits in such an analysis are assessed in economic terms, the interests of the poor are necessarily
downgraded in designing such a treaty. Consider the issue of rising sea levels. The destruction of a Hollywood star's getaway beach house might
translate into millions of dollars in the economic analysis, while the destruction of a Bangladeshi family's home might account for a fraction of one
percent of that amount. The same is true of the value of human life: the
deaths of many Bangladeshis might be considered equal to that of a single
American because the American is wealthier and willing to pay much more
to reduce risks. So Posner and Weisbach's baseline is one in which the interests of the poor count for little. Given this baseline, any move toward equal
treatment of those interests constitutes redistribution, a form of in-kind
foreign aid.
Putting aside the question of whether this is a valid way to frame the
question, Posner and Weisbach's argument against this form of "redistribution" is weak if not halfhearted, and in the end even they themselves do not
seem persuaded by it. Recall that they argue for cash transfers in order to
assist the poor (p. 78). But the option of massive cash transfers, it turns out,
is illusory. As they concede, "there are notorious difficulties in making development aid effective," and "[e]ven when rich countries want to help, it is
8. P. 4. If post-Copenhagen commitments are any guide, the benchmark for negotiations seems to be equalizing reductions in emissions intensity (emissions per unit of energy)
across developed and developing countries. See Frank Jotzo, Comparing the Copenhagen
Emissions Targets (Ctr. for Climate Econ. & Pol'y, Working Paper No. 1.10, Oct. 2010),
available at http://ssm.comabstract= 1878905.
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hard for them to do so" (p. 90). The absence of cash transfers is critical in
terms of the economic analysis. Moreover, in ethical terms, our inability to
offset the redistributive effects of climate change impacts by another mechanism means that we must consider those effects in setting climate policy.
Without a viable system for cash transfers, the optimal treaty can no
longer be one that equalizes the marginal cost of pollution reductions across
countries. Instead, the treaty should equalize countries' marginal sacrifices
in welfare stemming from carbon reductions. If one country is making a
greater marginal sacrifice in welfare than another, we could increase global
welfare by shifting more of the burden of reducing emissions to the other
country. The reason that equalizing the marginal financial burden no longer
works is that the same abatement cost translates into a greater loss of utility
in lower-income countries. 9 More simply, if we cannot fix the problem of
global poverty with cash transfers, then we cannot separate it from the design of climate measures.
Posner and Weisbach argue that the use of a climate treaty to assist the
poor "has to be compared to other foreign aid programs," and that "[t]here
are any number of other possible methods of making transfers" (p. 176).
This argument seems to suffer from what we might call the "fallacy of the
hypothetical alternative." It is a common type of argument: although it may
be true that A would be better than B, we should not adopt A because there
might be some other hypothetical alternative that would be superior to A.
Yet, we are not told what this other alternative might be, whether its implementation would actually be feasible, or whether it would be politically
viable. To say that we should not engage in redistribution unless we can implement the ideal form of redistribution is really to say that we should not
engage in redistribution at all.
Posner and Weisbach may be correct that there are other measures, some
of them perhaps superior, that could help redistribute income. But this
counts as an objection to using climate policy to assist in redistribution only
if one of two arguments holds. The first argument is that we are in danger of
overly redistributing income if we adopt the other measures and also use
climate policy to assist in redistribution. It seems very unlikely, however,
that the large redistributions that Posner and Weisbach advocate will be
achieved by other worthy projects that are currently politically feasible. The
second argument is that using climate policy to assist in redistribution would
crowd out other, more desirable forms of redistribution. This might be true if
the political process were entirely rational-first settling on the desired level
of redistribution and then comparing all possible methods of achieving the
goal. But this vision of political rationality seems more than a bit idealized.
The possible existence of better methods of redistribution matters little unless Posner and Weisbach can either present a menu of politically feasible,
more desirable methods of redistribution or else provide empirical support
for crowding out. Without a specific program for redistribution, however, we
9.

For a proof of this proposition, see Graciela Chichilnisky & Geoffrey Heal, Who

Should Abate Carbon Emissions? An InternationalViewpoint, 44 ECON. LETTERS 443 (1994).
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should not give up on the possibility of using climate policy to assist, at
least at the margins, with income distribution.
Posner and Weisbach end up with an equivocal position on redistribution. They reject the possibility of large cash transfers as part of a climate
agreement, but they regard as more plausible the idea that developing countries should be given more time than developed countries to impose
emission restrictions (p. 92). They also agree that the net benefits of a climate treaty-what they call the "surplus"-might be used to fund some
type of benefits for poor nations, although they are somewhat concerned
about the viability of this approach (pp. 94-96, 143). They ultimately
agree that "[c]limate change abatement may very well be part of this mix"
of methods for assisting the poor (pp. 177-78). And in their conclusion,
they concede that "[ilt would be somewhat better for the wealthy nations
to agree to a treaty that requires more aggressive reduction than would promote their interests-if that treaty would deliver substantial benefits to poor
nations, which are particularly vulnerable to the relevant risks" (p. 190).
In short, despite their initial resistance to including distributional issues
in climate negotiations, Posner and Weisbach ultimately go a long way toward accepting distributional claims as part of climate policy, so long as the
claims are not pushed to the point of upsetting the negotiations. In other
words, there is less to their opposition to using a climate treaty to address
distributional concerns than meets the eye.
II.

THE ISSUE OF CLIMATE COMPENSATION

Emitters of greenhouse gases will cause serious harm, especially in the
poorest countries, which often have very low emissions themselves. Posner
and Weisbach concede that "emissions in some countries have imposed serious risks on others, that the United States and China are expected to
remain the world's leading contributors, and that some nations, including
those in Africa, face serious risks even though their own emissions are trivial" (p. 101). An obvious case for some form of compensatory response
seems to exist at least as to the United States and the other rich countries
with the highest per capita emissions, such as Japan and the wealthier members of the European Union.
Posner and Weisbach, however, argue vigorously to the contrary. They
deploy a hodgepodge of arguments that are hard to address in a coherent
fashion. Some of the arguments seem strained at best, such as their fanciful
suggestion that the Bush Administration may have had a secret plan to increase U.S. emissions in order to obtain concessions in a later climate treaty
(p. 114). Needless to say, the authors provide no evidence of such a secret
plan. But other arguments they make deserve more careful attention.
One issue is how much responsibility for climate change should be assigned to developed countries with high emissions. As Posner and Weisbach
indicate, there is a clear relationship between gross domestic product and
carbon dioxide emissions; richer countries use more energy and emit more
carbon dioxide (pp. 38-39). Posner and Weisbach argue, however, that rich
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countries should not be assigned particular blame for current greenhouse gas
concentrations for two reasons: (1) responsibility is more evenly divided if we
include emissions from land use change and from other greenhouse gases (pp.
35-37); and (2) developing countries like China are rapidly overtaking developed countries in terms of annual absolute emissions (although not per capita
emissions) (p. 40).
Not all sources of greenhouse gases are equal in normative terms. Rich
countries have the ability to significantly reduce emissions without
significant harm to their standards of living. In contrast, emissions due to
agricultural activities may be unavoidable in feeding the rapidly expanding
world population. In addition, governments of developing countries may
have little capacity to control deforestation, much of which may be designed
to satisfy the demands of consumers in developed countries for wood. 10
Although emissions from developing countries such as China have been
increasing rapidly, developed countries like the United States have contributed to this increase by outsourcing manufacturing to those countries."
Given this rather complex situation, it seems too facile to dismiss the
responsibility of wealthy countries for climate change stemming from the
high contribution of energy use in those countries to atmospheric carbon
dioxide. However, in light of Posner and Weisbach's individual-centered
view of responsibility, per capita emissions are probably more relevant than
country-level emissions. Although Posner and Weisbach list a few small
countries with unusually high per capita cumulative carbon dioxide emissions (p. 37), emissions from a Luxembourg or Belize are not terribly
relevant to global policy issues. The overall trend is quite clear: the twenty
richest nations were home to about one-eighth of the world's population in
2000 but were responsible for 40 percent of all greenhouse gas emissions
from all sources (p. 37). In contrast, the countries representing the billion
people with the lowest incomes were responsible for less than 2 percent of
all the atmospheric carbon dioxide created by energy use (p. 38). Quibbling
over emissions statistics should not be allowed to obscure the basic facts.
Part of Posner and Weisbach's argument against the relevance of compensatory justice seems to stem from confusion between punishment and
remediation. The title of their chapter on compensation is "Punishing the
Wrong Doers" (p. 99). They contend that "the idea that nation-states can
be moral agents is highly unappealing, as it relies on notions of collective
responsibility that have been rejected by mainstream philosophers as well
as institutions such as criminal and tort law" (p. 101). But this claim is misplaced for two reasons. First, their argument addresses moral responsibility
only in the context of punishment rather than compensation. As a
10. Shadia Duery, An Overview of World Tropical Hardwood Resources, Forest Products
Trade and Environmental Issues (La. Forest Prods. Dev. Ctr., Working Paper No. 74, 2006),
availableat www.lfpdc.lsu.edu/publications/working-papers/wp74.pdf.
11. See Glen P. Peters et al., Growth in Emission Transfers via InternationalTrade from
1990 to 2008, 108 PRoc. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. 8903 (2011), available at www.pnas.org/
content/108/2118903.full. This does not mean, however, that the countries now hosting the
"exported" industries are free from responsibility for failing to control emissions.
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comparison of criminal law with tort law quickly reveals, we are far more
demanding of justification for imposing punishment than for compensation.
Thus, rejection of group punishment does not disprove a collective obligation of compensation.
Second, Posner and Weisbach's argument ignores the fact that nations
are quite commonly required to compensate for past wrongdoing. For example, after the first Gulf War, the United Nations established a tribunal to
assess damages against the nation of Iraq, which resulted in substantial
compensation for the environmental harm that Iraq caused during the war."
The argument also ignores the authors' own position later in the book. They
portray nations as moral agents when they say that "it is unethical for a nation to refuse to join a climate treaty in to order to free-ride off of others" (p.
170). They also posit that "wealthy nations have an ethical obligation to help
the poor, including those living in other, poor nations" (p. 174). Thus, attaching moral responsibilities to nations, even under the authors' own
framework, does not seem unacceptable in all settings.
A more important part of their argument is that it cannot be considered
blameworthy "for Americans to fail to reduce their greenhouse gas emitting
activities" (p. 112), because such unilateral actions would produce "no
benefit" (p. 113). This argument is both factually and morally questionable.
In terms of the factual issue, climate models show that any increase in
emissions, regardless of the existing level, causes incremental harm. 13 Unless we assume that the U.S. emissions restrictions would cause other
countries' emissions to increase enough in response to fully offset the United States' reductions, any reduction in U.S. emissions would decrease or at
least delay damage from climate change, even if the United States acted
alone. Posner and Weisbach maintain that unilateral action by the United
States could at best "have little effect on overall climate change-not so far
from zero even if aggressive and effective."14 This reflects what has been
called "the behavioral tendency to treat very small shares as zero."15 This
assumption is especially misleading when shares are assessed in percentage
terms, since a small percentage of a huge amount is still a large amount.
When dealing with a problem of the scale of climate change, even a small
change at the margin can translate into a substantial amount of harm in ab-

12.

For detailed discussion of this compensation scheme and its implementation, see
UN COMPENSATION COMMISSION (Cymie Payne & Peter
Sand eds., 2011).
13. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's synthesis of the physical science
for policymakers shows that differences in carbon dioxide concentrations where concentrations are stabilized from 350 ppm to 700 ppm translate into temperature changes from around
2 degrees Celsius to around 5 degrees Celsius. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 831 (2008).
14. P. 113. Douglas Kysar refers to this as a "consequentialist alibi." Douglas A. Kysar,
What Climate Change Can Do About Tort Law, 41 ENVTL. L. 1, 35 (2011).
15. See Kevin M. Stack & Michael P. Vandenbergh, The One Percent Problem, 111
COLUM. L. REV. 1385 (2011).
GULF WAR REPARATIONS AND THE
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solute terms. 6 Indeed, it is possible to translate each ton of carbon into an
equivalent amount of temperature change. 7 Moreover, U.S. initiatives could
spur innovative technologies and practices that could be adopted elsewhere,
leading to global improvements.
In terms of the moral issue, even if no single country could unilaterally

slow or moderate climate change, it does not follow that each country is free
from responsibility for its emissions. Tort law has long rejected the argument that, when harm proceeds from multiple sources, individuals can avoid
responsibility by showing that it would have made no difference if they
alone had acted properly. For instance, if two actors independently begin
fires negligently, neither actor can escape liability by arguing that the other
fire would have caused the same harm anyway. 8 The general tort rule is that
"at least where both causes involve comparable blameworthiness, both ac-

tors are liable, even though the conduct of either one was not a sine qua non
of the injury because of the conduct of the other."' 9 Thus, even if action by a
single country would have had little effect, assuming that other nations con-

tinued unrestrained emissions, nations are still not free from responsibility
for their excessive levels of emissions.
Excessive emissions not only harm others but unfairly benefit residents
of rich nations. Posner and Weisbach concede that "many Americans have
made choices that do not adequately take climate consequences into ac-

count."2 Americans have the benefit of cheap gasoline and low mileage
standards, allowing them to drive SUVs, pickup trucks, and other vehicles
that produce unduly high greenhouse emissions. They obtain electrical

16. Of course, it is also unquestionably true that "national measures can only be interim
steps to a global climate change solution." Rachel Brewster, Stepping Stone or Stumbling
Block: Incrementalism and National Climate Change Legislation, 28 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
245, 271 (2010).
17. See H. Damon Matthews et al., The Proportionalityof Global Warming to Cumulative Carbon Emissions, 459 NATURE 829 (2009).
18. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FouviS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 111 (3d ed.
2007) (stating that this is the "universal" outcome and that it would be "absurd" to relieve
either negligent party of liability).
19. See Boeing Co. v. Cascade Corp., 207 F.3d 1177, 1183 (9th Cir. 2000).
20.

P. 104. Some of those choices are political. Posner and Weisbach note as follows:

A more reasonable and serious criticism of American policy until very recently is that the
U.S. government did not take seriously the risk of climate change, may have deliberately
downplayed the risks when government officials knew better, and did not try to use its
diplomatic power to advance climate treaty negotiations as much as it should have.
P. 114. According to Posner and Weisbach, however, "[i]t is certainly plausible to think that
voting for politicians who adopt bad policies, or failing to vote for politicians who adopt good
policies, is not morally wrong except in extreme or unusual cases." P. 115. Note that Posner
and Weisbach do not directly endorse this proposition themselves but only say that it is plausible, and even then they add a proviso for extreme or unusual cases. It is hard to see why voters
should not be considered responsible for policies when they elect the candidates who support
those policies.
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power from cheap coal rather than more expensive renewable sources. 21
Americans also benefit as shareholders in companies that have profited from
the sale or use of huge amounts of fossil fuels.
These activities have served not to provide necessities or to attain a decent standard of living but to feed a level of consumption that is
extraordinary by global standards. With only one-twentieth of the world's
population, the United States accounts for a disproportionate level of annual
global resource consumption, including a fifth of the fossil fuels, a fifth of
the copper, and a quarter of the aluminum. 22 Moreover, the United States
produces a quarter of the world's carbon dioxide output and uses a third of
all paper and plastic. 23 From 1900 to 1990, the U.S. population tripled while
24
its use of raw materials multiplied seventeen times.
This does not seem to be a difficult case in which to apply the concept of
unjust enrichment and require the benefits to be redistributed to others.2 5 We
in the United States have enjoyed the benefits of consuming more than our
share of world resources, and in the course of doing so have produced carbon emissions harmful to less fortunate nations. As Posner and Weisbach
say in their paraphrase of the opposing argument, "The upshot is a very ugly
picture that depicts the citizens of wealthy countries ... consuming wasteful
goods such as SUVs and heated swimming pools over many decades, while
people in the poorest countries have barely had enough to eat" (p. 99). At
the same time that these activities have benefitted the richer countries, as
Posner and Weisbach concede, "some countries ... have imposed serious
risks on others ... [and] some nations, including those in Africa, face serious risks even though their own emissions [a]re trivial" (p. 101). Posner and
Weisbach provide some useful correctives about waxing too self-righteously
(or self-loathingly) about the blameworthiness of this conduct. But the fact

21. Roughly one-third of all the U.S. greenhouse emissions can be attributed to individual behavior by consumers. See Michael P. Vandenbergh & Anne C. Steinemann, The
Carbon-NeutralIndividual, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1673, 1694 (2007).
22.
Dave Tilford, Why ConsumptionMatters, SIERRA CLUB, http://www.sierraclub.org/
sustainable-consumption/tilford.asp (last visited Sept. 5, 2011). For additional information on
sustainable consumption, see generally ECON. FOR EQUITY & ENV'T, http://www.e3network.
org/ (last visited Aug. 19, 2011); ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., PROMOTING SUSTAINABLE CONSUMPTION: GOOD PRACTICES IN OECD COUNTRIES (2008), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/l/59/40317373.pdf; Sustainable Consumption, UNITED NATIONS ENV'T PROGRAMME, http://www.unep.org/themes/consumption/index.asp (last visited

Sept. 5, 2011); Sustainable Consumption, WORLD ECON. FORUM, http://www.weforum.
org/en/initiatives/DrivingSustainableConsumption/index.htm
UNIV. OF MANCHESTER SUSTAINABLE CONSUMPTION INST.,

(last visited

Sept. 5,

2011);

http://www.sci.manchester.ac.uk/

(last visited Sept. 5, 2011); and WORLD BuS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., SUSTAINABLE
CONSUMPTION FACTS & TRENDS FROM A BUSINESS PERSPECTIVE (2008), available at
http://www.wbcsd.org/pages/edocument/edocumentdetails.aspx?id= 142&nosearchtontextkey=
true.

23.
24.
25.
SHOBEN

Tilford, supra note 22.
Id.
Unjust enrichment is, of course, a familiar concept in American law. See ELAINE W.
ET AL., REMEDIES 780-98 (4th ed. 2007).
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remains that without consciously intending to do so we have benefitted
handily at the expense of others.
Posner and Weisbach are right that responsibility for climate change
does not fall neatly within the paradigm of direct individual responsibility.
Individual Americans are clearly not responsible for the harm of climate
change in the same way as a drunk driver is responsible for hitting a pedestrian. Climate change may not clearly fall into either the traditional
understanding of blameworthy conduct or the traditional understanding of
blameless conduct. But, as Douglas Kysar says, we may need to "try to
build new frameworks for the analysis of justice, ones that2 are
commensu6
rate with the temporal and geographic scale of the problem.
Posner and Weisbach do not seem entirely convinced by their argument
that it is impossible to draw a link between excessive emissions by individual parties and damage to victims of climate change. They ultimately concede
that it would be "plausible to understand corrective justice, in this domain,
in probabilistic terms, with the thought that victims should receive ... the
fraction of their injury that is probabilistically connected with climate
change" (p. 110). Similarly, although they spend several pages discussing
the difficulty of precisely identifying wrongdoers and victims (pp. 111-16),
they end up conceding that compensation could be considered on the "basis
of a kind of rough justice in an imperfect world" (p. 116). They conclude
finally that "it is inconceivable that a climate treaty would properly address
a problem of corrective justice" (p. 117). But then they add a critical disclaimer: "unless, of course, the questionable premises of the rough justice
argument are accepted" (p. 117).
Indeed, they admit that grievances by one nation against another often
do "culminate in reparations, assistance, or apologies that are appropriate to
the original wrong" (p. 117). The authors are then reduced to arguing that it
is "just not realistic" to expect such complex problems to be addressed in a
climate treaty, and they are obviously worried that compensation issues
might disrupt the overall negotiations (p. 117). These practical concerns
deserve the attention of negotiators but are irrelevant to the ethical validity
of compensation claims. In an imperfect world we should not expect perfect
justice, but this is hardly a reason to settle for no justice at all.
The real argument should be how much developed countries should be
responsible for climate impacts, not whether they have any responsibility for
compensation. Posner and Weisbach's arguments are best taken as justifications for whittling down the amount of compensation rather than eliminating
it entirely. Even relatively modest financial contributions to climate change
adaptation or to assisting climate mitigation in developing countries could
make a significant practical difference.
More significantly, although Posner and Weisbach reject the idea that
causing climate change harm to our contemporaries gives rise to a duty of
compensation, we will see in Part III that they do posit such a duty of compensation toward future generations. It is difficult to see why current
26.

Kysar, supra note 14, at 52.
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generations-whose lives overlap with our own life spans-should be entitled to less consideration than generations to be born in the future.
III.

FUTURE GENERATIONS

Discounting is a part of cost-benefit analysis that converts future harms
into current dollars. Essentially, discounting reverses the process of calculating compound interest to find the present day equivalent of some future cost
or benefit. 7 As one economist remarks, discounting "forces us to say that
what we might otherwise conceptualize as monumental events 'do not much
matter' when they occur in future centuries or millennia. 2 8 While they endorse discounting, Posner and Weisbach offer a proposal to reconcile its use
with our moral intuitions.
Economists emphasize two explanations for discounting: money could
be invested for a greater future return (the "opportunity cost of capital") and
people are impatient ("time preference"). The discount rate suggested by the
impatience explanation-the so-called "social discount rate"-is substantially lower than the rate indicated by the opportunity cost of alternative

investments.2 9 Essentially, the cost of capital compares a future environmental benefit with the returns from other investments.
Money spent on environmental improvement might instead go into other
investments. There is widespread agreement, even among critics of discounting, that these opportunity costs deserve consideration.30 We might
account for the loss of alternate investment opportunities by using the rate of
return on alternate investments as the rate for discounting benefits. 3 This
actually provides a measure of opportunity cost only if the lost opportunity

actually is an investment whose returns
accrue in the same future year, a fact
32
that is not always easy to determine.

Posner and Weisbach endorse an approach to discounting intended to
combine elements of the hard-boiled approach, using the market rate of in-

27. See generally Geoffrey Heal, Discounting:A Review of the Basic Economics, 74 U.
CHI. L. REV. 59 (2007) (providing a good overview of the complex economic issues raised by
discounting).
28. Martin L. Weitzman, Why the Far-DistantFuture Should Be Discountedat Its Lowest Possible Rate, 36 J. ENVTL. EcON. & MGMT. 201, 201 (1998).
29. In a world without taxes, the social discount rate and the opportunity cost theoretically should be the same. But the tax system drives a wedge between the two. See, e.g., Robert
C. Lind, A Primeron the Major Issues Relating to the Discount Rate for EvaluatingNational
Energy Options, in DISCOUNTING FOR TIME AND RISK IN ENERGY POLICY 21, 24-32 (Robert

C. Lind et al. eds., 1982).
30. See Tyler Cowen & Derek Parfit, Against the Social Discount Rate, in JUSTICE
BETWEEN AGE GROUPS AND GENERATIONS 144, 151-52 (Peter Laslett & James S. Fishkin
eds., 1992).
31. See Edward R. Morrison, Comment, Judicial Review of Discount Rates Used in
Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1333, 1341-44 (1998).
32.

See Lind, supra note 29, at 50-52.
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terest, with a more ethics-oriented concern about future generations.33 They
agree that "choosing projects solely through cost-benefit analysis with discounting can result in serious injustice to the future and that we must respect
the principle of intergenerational neutrality" by treating members of different generations as equals." This may require that we engage in some
projects that offer less than the market rate of return in order to maintain a
sufficient legacy for future generations. But "we still must carefully consider
the opportunity costs of projects and pick those with the highest rate of return" (p. 161). Market rates represent the opportunity cost of investment, so
we should avoid choosing projects whose interest rates are markedly lower
(p. 160). In short, we should exhaust the available investments at or near the
market rate of return before accepting any projects with much lower rates of
return (p. 160).
One problem with this argument is that climate change might have catastrophic effects on members of later generations that cannot be offset by
increased savings. How seriously we take that argument will depend on how
much weight we give to the possibility of such catastrophic outcomes. This
issue will be discussed in the next section.
Another problem is that we actually have few, if any, alternative investment projects with payoff periods longer than a century. If such projects are
not available, the opportunity cost of climate change mitigation projects is
actually much lower (pp. 164-65). Posner and Weisbach have two responses. The first is another version of the fallacy of hypothetical alternatives.
Posner and Weisbach do not identify projects that offer long-term returns
equivalent to the market rate of interest (let alone projects at the same scale
as climate change mitigation). Instead, they merely assert that "it is hard to
imagine that there [are] not other projects" with a return closer to the market
rate (p. 165). Thus, they argue that we should not adjust climate policy to
protect the rights of future generations, even though they admit that (1) doing so means that we will commit an injustice to later generations, and (2)
they have not identified any specific way of compensating those victims for
the injustice. This is hardly a compelling argument.
Their second argument is that, although we may not be able to set aside
investment funds many generations into the future, climate policy has the
same problem, since later generations may decide to start using fossil fuels
again (p. 165). This argument fails to acknowledge a fundamental difference
in the economic dynamics of the two strategies.
33. This approach seems to derive from Louis Kaplow, Discounting Dollars,Discounting Lives: IntergenerationalDistributive Justice and Efficiency, 74 U. CHi. L. REV. 79 (2007).
34. P. 159. Posner and Weisbach do not fully explain this claim, except to say that
"[b]ecause of climate change, our legacy to our descendants seems to be far lower than we
once thought. For that reason, we have a moral obligation to adjust." P. 168. The assumption,
although they do not develop it, seems to be that our prior legacy represents more than generosity toward future generations; it in some sense represents our moral sense of what those
generations are due. Our moral stance regarding future generations is a complex issue that
cannot be discussed here. It seems plausible to assume that justice may require at least some
level of concern regarding the interests of later generations.
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The financial investment strategy creates an escalating incentive to
cheat. Suppose we create an investment trust to hold income for 200 years
and then pay out to later generations, either by direct payment to individuals
or using the money to offset tax decreases. Assuming the investments are
successful, every year the trust is in existence the trust fund grows larger and
the temptation to invade it becomes greater. Maintaining the investment
strategy is like being on a diet where every day a larger and more enticing
slice of chocolate cake is placed in front of you-the difference being that it
is necessary to maintain the "diet" not only for years but for centuries.
In contrast, the temptation to return to the use of fossil fuels becomes
smaller over time, so cheating becomes continually less likely. If fossil fuels
are not allowed or are severely limited, there is a huge incentive to make
renewable energy and energy conservation cheaper, so the economic incentive to use fossil fuels becomes smaller. Moreover, use of fossil fuels
requires a huge investment in infrastructure-railroads to coal mines, new
coal-burning power plants, oil refineries, oil supertankers, and so forth. After
the existing infrastructure for fossil fuels decays, use of fossil fuels will be
less appealing than at the present, when fossil fuels have the advantage of an
existing infrastructure that has already been paid for. Thus, switching away
from fossil fuels is like ending an addiction: very difficult at the beginning,
but easier over time. Although there is no guarantee against a possible relapse, maintaining a multigenerational policy for a move away from fossil
fuels is likely to provide fewer incentives for reversion than a massive investment trust.
In the end, Posner and Weisbach's defense of market discounting is, like
their rejection of redistributive and compensatory justice concerns, rather
halfhearted. They admit that it is possible that climate policy "may include
elements that redistribute to the future more effectively," and they say that
they are "agnostic" as to this possibility. If they are right to admit the possibility of using climate policy to redistribute to future generations, then an
adjustment to the discount rate could serve this purpose. In any event, Posner and Weisbach contend that the applicable market rate for climate change
discounting is very low for technical reasons. 35 Thus, their ultimate position
may not be too different in practical effect from that of the opposing view
36
among economists, which calls for very low rates for ethical reasons.

35. P. 152. The argument is based on uncertainty about future rates of return, which
leads to a kind of averaging in which the possibility of low returns weighs more heavily than
the possibility of high returns. Pp. 152-53. This argument derives from Weitzman, supra note

28.
36. Posner and Weisbach are correct, however, to reject arguments for giving up discounting altogether. See Daniel A. Farber, From Here to Eternity: Environmental Law and
Future Generations, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 289 (arguing in favor of hyperbolic discounting at

low rates).
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IV. UNCERTAINTY AND CATASTROPHE, THE MISSING

DIMENSIONS OF THE ANALYSIS

Posner and Weisbach use an "optimal climate treaty" as their benchmark, with the optimal treaty to be determined on the basis of economic
analysis. Unfortunately, it is far from clear that the requisite economic
analysis is possible. Climate change is a prime example of a problem with
large downside risks that are not well understood. As Daniel Cole explains,
the stumbling block is the "wide range of possible temperature increases...
including a five-percent probability that temperature increases will equal or
exceed 6 degrees Celsius and a two-percent probability of increases equal to
or greater than 8 degrees Celsius within the next 100 to 200 years."37 Yet,
without some clear understanding of the probability of various outcomes,
assessing the probable costs of climate change (critical for cost-benefit analysis) does not seem possible.
The customary measure for how strongly the climate system responds to
changes in the level of greenhouse gases is climate sensitivity. Climate sensitivity is measured as the equilibrium temperature increase caused by a
permanent doubling of preindustrial carbon dioxide concentrations.3 8 Studies based on historical climate data find that climate sensitivity is unlikely to
be below 1.5 degrees Celsius. The upper bound, however, is more difficult to
determine for technical reasons-it could exceed 4.5 degrees Celsius, although such high values are much less likely on the basis of the historical
records for temperature and atmospheric carbon dioxide levels than those in
the 1.5-3.5 degrees Celsius range.39 A second line of research examines
climate sensitivity in models predicting future climate change. The most
frequent sensitivity values are around 3 degrees Celsius, but much higher
values cannot be excluded.40 Climate sensitivity is almost certainly greater
than 1 degree Celsius, but there is between a 2 percent and a 20 percent
chance that it exceeds 5 degrees Celsius.4' A five-degree rise may not sound
like much, but it is "equivalent to the change in average temperatures from
the last ice age to today."4 2

We can be highly confident about the existence of human-caused climate
change and the likelihood that it will have serious effects. There is strong
37. Daniel H. Cole, The Stem Review and Its Critics: Implicationsfor the Theory and
Practice of Benefit-Cost Analysis, 48 NAT. RES. J. 53, 75 (2008). Feedback effects, such as
methane releases triggered by temperature increases, threaten to accelerate temperature
changes. See Katey Walter Anthony, Methane: A Menace Surfaces, Sci. AMER., Dec. 2009, at
69-70.
38.

NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 10-11 (2007).

39.

Gerald A. Meehl et al., Global Climate Projections,in INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL

ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 747, 747-49,

800-01 (Susan Solomon et al. eds., 2007).

40.

Id. at 799.

41.
Summary for Policy Makers, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, supra note 39, at 1, 13.

42.

STERN, supra note 38, at xvi (2007).
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residual uncertainty, however, about the scale of climate change impacts,
globally and regionally. Posner and Weisbach acknowledge this problem,
observing that there is "a large amount of uncertainty about the impact of
emissions" (p. 45), and that "[tihe risk of catastrophe, even if small, may
drive policy decisions" (p. 88). As the Council of Economic Advisors wrote
recently, "it is evident that policy based on the most likely outcomes may
not adequately protect society
because such estimates fail to reflect the
' '43
harms at higher temperatures.
Modeling the systemic economic impact of climate change and the costs
of adaptation and mitigation involves tremendous challenges, particularly if
the projection extends more than a few years." An expert at the Congressional Research Service indicated that "[1]ong-term projections ... should
be viewed with skepticism.... The finer the detail, the greater the skepticism should be. '45 Even the more confident economic modelers such as
Nordhaus and Boyer admit that attempts to46estimate the impacts of climate
change continue to be highly "speculative.
Outputs of various economic models are so far apart as to make it perilous to rely on any one model or even on a small subset of models.
According to one reviewer, "Cost estimates of Kyoto emissions reductions
diverge'47 by a factor of about 500 (and not all estimates show an economic
loSS).
In any event, estimates of mitigation costs must be taken with some
skepticism, which makes it difficult to determine how much mitigation to
require. Thus, it may not be possible to identify the "optimal treaty" that
provides the benchmark for Posner and Weisbach's conclusions.
The biggest wild card in economic analysis, though, may be the possibility of catastrophic climate change. Based on an analysis of reported
studies, economist Martin Weitzman estimates that a "'best guess' estimate
of the extreme bad tail" places the odds at about 5 percent of a temperature
increase over 10 degrees Celsius (18 degrees Fahrenheit) and a 1 percent
change of an increase of 20 degrees Celsius (36 degrees Fahrenheit).4 8 As
Weitzman explains, this rate of increase would be extraordinary:
43. U.S. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL OF
ECONOMIC ADVISORS 242 (2010).
44. See Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Climate Regulation and the Limits of
Cost-Benefit Analysis 19-32 (Univ. of Chi. Pub. Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 525, 2010),
availableat http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1662147.
45. Darren Samuelsohn, Climate: Uncertain Economic Models Create Headachesfor
Senate Panel, ENV'T & ENERGY DAILY, Oct. 14, 2009, available at http://
www.eenews.net/Greenwire/2009/10/14/archive/5?terms=Climate%3A+Uncertain+Economic
+Models+Create+Headaches+for+Senate+Panel.
46. E.g., WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS & JOSEPH BOYER, WARMING THE WORLD: ECONOMIC
MODELS OF GLOBAL WARMING 86 (2000) (conditioning their model on the need for a "detailed inventory and valuation of climatically sensitive regions for validation").
47. Philippe Tulkens & Henry Tulkens, The White House and the Kyoto Protocol: Double Standards on Uncertainties and Their Consequence 8 (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei,
Working Paper No. 89, 2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=910811.
48. Martin L. Weitzman, On Modeling and Interpreting the Economics of Catastrophic
Climate Change, 91 REV. ECON. & STAT. 1, 1 (2009). Antony Millner provides an excellent
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Societies and ecosystems in a world whose average temperature has
changed in the geologically instantaneous time of two centuries or so [by
these amounts] are located in terra incognita,since such high temperatures

have not existed for hundreds of millions of years and such a rate of global
temperature change might be unprecedented even on a timescale of billions of years.4 9

Thus, "the planetary welfare effect of climate changes... implies a nonnegligible probability of worldwide catastrophe. '5° Or, as Posner and
Weisbach put it, there is a "genuine risk of a truly catastrophic outcomefor example, significant increases in global temperatures and massive sea
level rises that would change human life in terrible ways that are difficult to
imagine" (pp. 1-2).
If climate change results in a drastic global threat to society, increasing
the rate of savings is not likely to be a workable form of compensation to
future generations. If areas of Africa or India face devastating droughts and
famine, the dead cannot be comforted by increases in foreign aid. And if
excessive carbon emissions in some countries cause devastation in others, it
becomes harder to resist the conclusion that a wrong has been done, not
merely an innocent spillover effect from the legitimate industrial activities
of the more fortunate. Thus, the moral imperative to control emissions
seems stronger than in the Posner and Weisbach model, where harm can
always be fully offset through financial transfers.
When catastrophic impacts make offsetting transfers to future generations
infeasible, discounting at the market level would lead to a lower-than-optimal
level of emissions control. We can deal with this misfit between market discounts and optimum policy by making an ad hoc adjustment after performing
the economic analysis to reflect our duties toward future generations. But
there is a strong argument for making the adjustment through the discount
rate instead. After all, the discount rate is the part of the analysis that most
explicitly considers tradeoffs over time. Moreover, since the argument for
using market rates depends on the availability of offsetting transfers, it
would seem odd to continue to use the market rate even when the argument
fails. Finally, the market rate itself might be very low (or even negative) if
we anticipate catastrophic outcomes: capital investments made today will
have poor returns if future catastrophes are in store, so the opportunity cost
for investing in climate policy is very low.
review of the Weitzman view and its critics. See Antony Millner, On Welfare Frameworks and
Catastrophic Climate Risks (Feb. 10, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at
ssm.com/abstract=1799481. Millner concludes that the primary lesson is the need to reconsider methods of assessing social welfare when catastrophic outcomes are possible. Id.
49. Weitzman, supra note 48, at 1. Even one critic of Weitzman concurs that "[m]any
people would agree that a 5 percent chance of a 100 change, or a 1 percent chance of a 20'
change, would be a catastrophic prospect for human societies." William D. Nordhaus, An
Analysis of the Dismal Theorem 10 (Coales Found., Discussion Paper No. 1686, 2009), avail-

able at http//ssm.com/abstracts=1330454. Nordhaus contends, however, that the probabilities
are lower. See id. at 10-12.
50. Weitzman, supra note 48, at 1.
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CONCLUSION

In developing their arguments, Posner and Weisbach begin with a conventional economic analysis, which recommends the use of economically
efficient regulations based on cost-benefit analysis coupled with cash payments or taxes to handle any concerns about the distribution of wealth. This
analysis fits neatly with their recommendation of an optimal climate treaty
coupled with foreign aid (to handle distributional issues with poor countries)
and increased investment (to transfer funds to future generations harmed by
climate change). The analysis separates the shape of the treaty from ethical
concerns about the poor or future generations, and the idea of compensatory
justice simply does not translate into the resulting framework.
Although this conventional analysis provides the main framework of
their proposed approach to climate policy, Posner and Weisbach, to their
credit, introduce a number of important qualifications to it. They agree that,
as a matter of "rough justice," the historic role of developed countries in
emitting greenhouse gases "could serve as a factor in allocating greenhouse
gas reductions" although they resist this conclusion as an unwarranted imposition of collective responsibility (p. 116). They also agree that the
benefits of climate change reduction should be funneled to nations that have
taken the lead in controlling emissions (p. 133), which obviously means
depriving the laggard nations of benefits they might otherwise receive. More
generally, they say that as long as each country does at least as well from a
climate agreement as it would from business as usual (globally unrestricted
emissions growth), then ethical considerations should reallocate any additional benefits (p. 143). Finally, they agree that even an economically
optimal climate treaty might be unjust to future generations (p. 154), although they recommend increasing other investments as a form of
compensation rather than reducing carbon emissions further.
This Review suggests that ethical considerations should play an even
greater role than Posner and Weisbach suggest. The injustice of causing
harm to the poorest countries and future generations provides powerful arguments for stringent limitations on emissions or, where feasible, strenuous
efforts to limit the human toll of climate impacts-and cash compensation
for possible catastrophic harm may not be adequate even if feasible. To the
extent that harmful climate change cannot be avoided, the rich countries that
have contributed so much to emissions should provide funding for adaptation and mitigation efforts to reduce harm in the poorest countries.
These ethical concerns should be important considerations in formulating climate policy, not just second-order corrections to economic analysis.
As compared with the typical economic focus exclusively on cost-benefit
analysis, Posner and Weisbach move in the right direction, but they do not
move far enough toward including ethical considerations in their analysis. In
trying to free their discussion from ethical arguments, they risk the very
breakdown in international dialogue that they hope to avoid.

